

Caress Schenk

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The research trip to Russia described herein, funded by State Department Title VIII funds provided by American Councils for International Education, focused on political, economic and social factors impacting labor migration from CIS countries to Russia. The goal of the research is to locate Russia's immigration regime in the global context in order to properly assess its strengths and weaknesses. The project asks whether and how factors of regime type, level of nationalist discourse and xenophobia in society and economic demand as well as the interactions between these factors affect immigration policies. The research completed in Russia during 2009 will be the basis of a comparative study including a number of other countries of immigration (US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Singapore).

The research is organized around three research questions. First, the question "what is the relationship between regime type and immigration regime?" functions alongside the hypothesis that democracies are more likely to promote liberal immigration regimes. The expectation that democratic regimes that are premised on a liberal political philosophy will have relatively open immigration policies is based on the idea that individual rights are held in high regard in these countries and international human rights norms are more likely to be upheld. Further, democratic regimes are expected to have developed civil society, which can advocate for immigrant rights.

Second, the question "how does nationalism and xenophobia in society affect immigration policies?" is located alongside the hypothesis that the more pervasive nationalist discourse is in a society, the easier it will be for a closed immigration regime to proceed unhindered (i.e. with relatively little protest or subversive action from domestic actors). If the hypothesis about democracy and liberal immigration regimes holds true, one might ask whether or not domestic actors in non-democracies have the power to protest or subvert government policy. On one level, however, the analysis that proceeds from this second question will measure the compatibility of society's views with government policy. On a deeper level, however, the xenophobic climate of a society and a government's desired immigration policies may not be mutually exhaustive. In these cases it is possible that immigration policies are justified on the basis of nationalism despite complex motivations for the policies themselves. It is these types of relationships between society and state (and economy, as will be shown) that create a complex web of policy inputs and outputs.

Finally, the question "what causes an immigration regime to function in the formal (v. informal) realm?" will guide the discussion of the economy and labor market's relationship with immigration policies and populations. This discussion will build on the findings of the first two questions and will proceed under the hypothesis that the more labor market and economic demand conflict with societal policy inputs, the more the migration regime will move into the informal realm, where the state makes purely symbolic efforts to control immigration. Symbolic efforts serve to please the general public, whereas a lack of enforcement allows economic actors to continue using immigrant labor as is most useful.

### **Regime type and Immigration Policies**

In order to explore the relationship between regime type and the relative openness of immigration regimes, this portion of the research looks at the legal status of migrants, immigrant registration processes, work permits, and legal accountability at the domestic and international levels. Prior to the research trip, I explored the laws and policies on the books in Russia, many of which came into effect as a part of new legislation in 2007.

Current laws and bureaucratic procedures regulating the Russian immigration regime are quite complicated, and therefore it was extremely useful to talk to both scholars who study migration as well as NGOs that work with migrants in order to gain a proper picture of the situation. On the whole, most experts interviewed agree that changes to immigration laws in 2007 can be classified as a liberalization of the immigration regime. This is not to say, of course, that the immigration policies in Russia today are liberal, simply that they are an improvement over the previous period, which to a substantial degree had retained policies and practices of the Soviet period in style and substance.

Despite the fact that under the 2007 laws it is now easier for migrants to register with the government on arrival to Russia and that CIS migrants are now able to obtain for themselves a work permit that allows them to change their place of work freely, many problems are reported. Representatives of international migrant advocacy groups described how the three day period in which a migrant must register after arriving to Russia is simply not enough time. Certain international organizations are working with the Federal Migration Service (FMS) to lengthen this time frame. A scholar from a leading migration research center in Moscow described how by law work permits should not be attached to a single employer, though recently as a result of the world financial crisis, the practice of including the name of the employer on the migration card has developed. This practice, which does not correspond with legislation, reduces workers to the status of foreign workers from visa countries, whose legal working status is tied to a specific employer.

One of the important procedures established in the 2007 regulations was a quota for workers from the CIS. These workers do not need a visa to enter Russia. Prior to 2007 quotas only regulated workers who were required to have visas. The quota, which allotted a certain number of work permits for CIS citizens, for the first year was quite generous and aimed to legalize all of the workers who were already on the territory of the Russian Federation illegally. Since then, however, quotas have been reduced dramatically each year. In fact quotas were a consistent theme of the interviews I conducted, and most agreed that they have become an important political tool to manage societal and economic demands.

As a part of the package of 2007 laws, there was a government order banning all foreign workers from certain sectors of the economy including markets. In essence the quotas allocating work permits for these places of work were reduced to zero. However, many migrants were able to obtain residence permits, obviating a work permit, in order to comply with the new procedures. An expert on migration explained to me that many people obtained these residence permits “on a shadow basis.” “It is difficult to obtain this paperwork,” the expert told me, “but possible through various channels, including corruption.”

Relevant legislation can be divided into two categories: those that migrants must comply with in order to be legally on the territory of the Russian Federation, and those that protect the rights of migrants once on that territory. There are no international regulations that fall into the first category. Domestic law, however, spans both categories and examples of the first are described above.

As for international law, Russia is not a party to the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, or to the ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. Russia signed the European Social Charter in 2000, which guarantees certain rights to migrants. According to official Council of Europe lists of signatories it has not yet been ratified. However Russian news sources report that the Charter was in fact ratified this summer (2009). Nevertheless, when asked about Russia’s compliance with international law such as this, a representative of one of the central international organizations in Moscow reflected on Russia’s compliance with the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, which it ratified in 2004. Of the CIS countries, Russia is the only country that has not created shelters for trafficking victims, an action plan for implementation of the

protocol, or domestic law to support the international standards. In fact, Russia has done nothing to comply with this protocol.

Russia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, which guarantees the children of illegal migrants have the right to attend school. Despite this, after the siege of a hospital in Southern Russia by Chechen rebels, the Moscow city government made school attendance contingent on the legal registration of parents. One local NGO interviewed described how they, along with the General Procurator undertook a legal case to challenge this decision. Both the Moscow city court and Supreme Court agreed that children should be allowed to attend school despite the legal status of their parents. Several experts interviewed commented that the situation is much improved now.

As far as migration laws are concerned violations can result in deportation, yet it was extremely difficult to find any sort of consensus about how often this occurs. NGOs, scholars and journalists interviewed all reported different results. Some said deportations rarely occur unless they are being used as a political tool (as in the case of the anti-Georgian campaign in 2006). Others said deportations occur regularly. Others said they don't occur at all because neither the Russian government, employers, nor the home governments (especially in the case of poorer countries like Tajikistan) have the means or desire to pay for the transport of illegal workers. Still others said it is impossible to know how many people are deported each year, despite the fact that the FMS reports these statistics on their website (in the first six months of 2009, of 47 deportation cases brought to the FMS 27 people were deported federal budget funds were used in 15 of these cases). One of the interviews with a Moscow NGO revealed that the legal and administrative procedures for deportation are quite involved and drawn out, and can result in a migrant sitting in a deportation detention center for an indeterminate amount of time. In the end, decisions for deportation are made quite arbitrarily as they are up to the discretion of individual judges. This particular NGO represents migrants' interests in court in these deportation cases.

Originally, I had hoped to use data about deportation to investigate whether there was institutional xenophobia at work. However, the nationality of deportees is not reported in official sources, and therefore it is difficult to discern whether certain ethnic groups are deported more often than others. Yet the issue of deportation reveals a gap in migration legislation and that decision are left to individual judges is an example of how the rule of law is not firmly established in Russia.

According to Russian law, migrants have the same rights as native workers with minimal exemptions. Though foreigners may not work as state officials, there is no discrimination based on gender, color or nationality. In addition to these laws, Russia's Labor Codex regulates work conditions and relations. These include regulations on wages, maximum number of hours, work contracts. Though there are repeated violations of these laws, migrants and employers often prefer to settle disputes outside of court. One of the Moscow-based NGOs interviewed acts as a go-between, helping migrants to settle disputes outside of court. Another of the NGOs prefers to work through the court system, as they hope to create judicial precedent for these cases. However, since migrants prefer to settle these disputes outside of court, this goal is not reaching its potential.

In short, the laws that are on the books in Russia do not adequately describe the immigration situation. Therefore it is necessary to look at factors of society and economy to try and explain why laws do not work as prescribed.

### **Xenophobic Climate and Immigration Regime**

In order to assess the nationalist climate of a society, both societal and institutional xenophobia are considered. Xenophobia in society can be measured through public opinion surveys, media coverage and treatment of migrants, and the activity of NGOs advocating for or against migrants.

Public opinion surveys from the Moscow-based Levada Center show that there is consistent nationalist sentiment in Russian society, as 57% of Russians today support the idea of “Russia for Russians,” either wholesale or with reasonable limits. This number has remained at or above 50% since 2001. Similarly, a majority of those surveyed say that the government should restrict the influx of migrants to Russia and that illegal immigrants should be expelled. Yet the same surveys show that in 2008, 65% of those surveyed did not feel ethnic tension in their city or region (a figure that has remained consistently above 60% in yearly surveys since 2005). Similarly the survey finds that since 2002, over 80% of respondents report that they rarely or practically never feel hostility toward or from ethnic minorities. One Muscovite interviewed summed up this duality by saying that attitudes towards migrants and minorities are a matter of convenience, especially in regard to citizens from the Former Soviet Union: if it serves someone’s purposes (political or otherwise), they will happily refer to a citizen of Ukraine, Georgia or Kazakhstan as kindred in culture and history. On the other hand, if it is more expedient to demonize those same citizens of former Soviet states, these immigrants are easily made out to be criminals and interlopers.

The director of a xenophobia watch-dog in Russia described to me the roots of xenophobia in Russia today as a continuation of the biological conception of race established in the Soviet period. This is why the writings of “ethnic scientist” Lev Gumilev are so popular, both at the popular level and as textbooks for university students. “Of course it’s not direct racism,” he explains, “but it’s a theory which prepares anyone to become racist. Because it’s very biological.”

A scholar of migration and xenophobia from a leading Moscow university explained that xenophobia in Russian society today comes from the mass media, public policy, mass culture and especially from youth sub-culture. However, none of these sources of xenophobia could gain ground if it were not for the tolerance of government leaders, who support xenophobic sentiment even to the degree that the Kremlin has funded anti-migrant campaigns.

Content analysis of Russian newspapers completed before the period of fieldwork shows that tabloid-style newspapers, which are often owned by oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin, often portray migrants and minorities in sensationally negative light. This is a common criticism of the Russian media, that migrants are portrayed as criminals and that they steal the jobs of Russian nationals. Thus it is not surprising that during the course of casual conversation with many Muscovites, they reiterated the common refrains that migrants take Russian jobs and bring diseases from their native countries.

A surprising finding from the research is the extent to which NGOs are involved in advocacy for migrant rights. This is an important, yet puzzling, finding. If xenophobia comes from the top, it is strange that the government would allow these migrants-rights organizations to operate freely, especially given the sometimes antagonistic relationship the Russian government has with NGOs. The director of one of these organizations reported that they work freely and are well established. He added that the organization has a good relationship with the authorities because they do not work in a political manner. To work in a political manner, he explained, damages the cause. However, the organizations I visited are quite small, employing less than a dozen workers, and often have very modest office space. One of the organizations described themselves as quite small, helping around 800 people per month. While this number is only a small fraction of the millions of migrants in Russia, it is quite remarkable that this office of 5 workers accomplishes such a task. A notable exception to this trend is an organization with a large office in a prestigious Stalin-style building. The organization is funded by a number of sources, including the Federal Migration Service and the Moscow City Government. Though their staff has been reduced recently to about a half dozen or so, this is owing to a dispute with Western funders according to a former volunteer.

NGOs working on the issue of labor migration in Russia can be divided into two camps. There are those that work with government agencies such as the FMS to pull Russia’s policies towards international

norms. These types of organizations tend to be focused on the progress that has been made and the future potential for further progress. Other NGOs that work with migrants, helping them to navigate the legal and bureaucratic hurdles of the system in order to remain legal, tend to focus more on the deficiencies of the current system. This divide likely owes to two factors. First, the NGOs that focus on deficiencies tend to work more closely with migrants, advocating for specific migrants in specific cases and therefore have more direct experience with the bureaucratic hurdles and legal troubles migrants encounter. The NGOs that work with government agencies are more focused on long-term policies. Second, the NGOs that work with the government have a greater interest in maintaining relationships with government bodies, and therefore must be much more careful about voicing criticism of current policies.

In addition to NGOs there are trade unions that represent the sectors of construction and trade. While the construction union specifically includes migrants in their membership and makes special provisions for migrant labor, the union focused on trading enterprises neither specifically includes nor excludes migrants from membership and makes no special mention of migrant labor. Both unions are members of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, whose Chairman Shmakov has a permanent audience with Putin and Medvedev, according to a labor expert interviewed.

Societal xenophobia also includes activity of nationalist groups and attacks on foreigners, both of which mark a climate of anti-migrant attitudes. An absence of systematic persecution of migrants would indicate an environment that ensured effective protection of the rights of minorities. Migrant attacks and nationalist group activity demonstrates that those with xenophobic motives are allowed to act with impunity. The Sova Center reports 258 people have been victims of hate crimes so far this year (data up to the end of August 2009). From the period of January 1-July 31, nearly 40% of crimes occurred in Moscow. Of 531 hate crimes in 2008, only 33 guilty verdicts against 114 people (with 28 given probation or released from punishment) were handed down. In the same period, 7 guilty verdicts against 40 people (with 4 probations) were handed down in Moscow, meaning 20% of guilty verdicts against 38% of perpetrators (with 14% of probations) when compared across the whole of Russia.

One of the problems in Russia is that hate crimes are prosecuted unevenly. Despite the fact that legislation has been developed in the past few years, it has not been put to use effectively as of yet. This shows an element of institutional xenophobia in that often victims of hate crimes are minorities (according to the Sova Center, in 2008 Central Asians were the most frequent victims of hate crimes) and police do not bother to seek the true perpetrator of the crime because they sympathize with anti-migrant motives. One of the NGOs interviewed described that racist sentiments come from the elite levels and sift down through all levels of the government organs and bureaucracy. All of the NGOs interviewed told stories of how the police are reluctant to help investigate matters of racism.

A further problem with legislation in this area deals with other forms of nationalist activity. Nationalist groups operate both at the fringes of politics as small political parties and as organizers of rallies and marches, and in society at large. Yet the issue of anti-extremist legislation is quite controversial as of late. I interviewed an expert on this subject, who said the legislation is impossible to implement as written because the definitions are quite intangible. For example, it is a crime under Russian law to incite others to violence, which is a legitimate component of this type of legislation. However it is also illegal to incite others to ethnic, religious or social discord. The definition of these categories is left open to interpretation. In the end, prosecutions of these types of cases are mostly a matter of fulfilling quotas, according to the expert interviewed. Prosecutions fulfill the need of officials to appear as though they are fighting extremism, and so they convict a minor offender (for example, someone who writes a racist statement on a web forum), while leaving someone with a more clear record of incitement to violence alone.

Other measures of systematic discrimination are ethnic profiling by police as well as the legislation and prosecution of hate crimes. Ethnic profiling by the police is apparent on a daily basis in Moscow. It is a

common occurrence to see someone of dark skin stopped on the streets, the police checking their papers. Because both the FMS and the police are a part of the Ministry of the Interior, the police act as an enforcement mechanism for migration legislation. In reality, this leads to a securitization of migration policy. One Moscow-based NGO interviewed that works primarily with refugees reports regular harassment by the police of these minorities on the street, so much so that harassment by law enforcement appears as a regular category in their tabulation of racially motivated attacks and harassment.

Finally, the attitudes of government officials, displayed through public statements and speeches, can be used to measure the level of xenophobia at the elite level. A recent example of this is an article from *Itogi* magazine, published July 6, 2009 by Alexandr Bastrykin, who is the head of the Federal Investigation Committee in the General Procurator's office. Bastrykin cited statistics that one out of three crimes is committed by migrants and emphasized the danger of foreigners to Russian society. A xenophobia expert interviewed described the article as a typical example of exploiting populist ideas. The idea that political figures appeal to populist ideas was a common theme in interviews. It seems that xenophobia comes from the top down, but part of the motivation for these elite statements is to appeal to widespread xenophobia in the public. Consequently elite opinion is both a response to and a reinforcement of public opinion.

### **Economic Demand and the Informality of Immigration Regulation**

The first order of course in this third area is to determine the size and composition of Russia's labor market in order to assess the economic demand for immigrant labor. Data on the size of the labor market is readily available from the International Labor Organization (ILO). Data on the composition of foreign workers (or sending countries) comes from the FMS.

The ILO reports that the economically active population in Russia was 75,159,000 in 2007. Statistics received directly from the FMS report 1,717,137 employed migrants in that same year. Of these, 1,152,786 (67%) were from CIS countries. This means that 2.8% of the labor force is comprised of migrants, and 1.5% of the labor force is made up of CIS migrants. One of the scholars interviewed reports a slightly higher percentage (3.2%) for the whole of Russia, adding that in Moscow 7.6% of the labor force is comprised of migrants.

Next, it is important to look at the size of illegal versus legal immigration. Comparing these figures can help show the divergence of formal and informal processes. Large numbers of illegal in comparison to legal immigrants displays a predominance of informal methods being used to fulfill labor demand. Estimates are that there are 3-5.5 million illegal migrants in Russia and 1-1.5 million in Moscow. A joint publication by the International Organization for Migration, ILO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe reports that this 3-5.5 million comprises about 5-7% of the workforce in Russia.

Based on these figures, 64-76% of the migrant population in Russia is illegal. One of the scholars interviewed notes that this is down from 90-95% in 2000, prior to the liberalization of the immigration regime in 2007. In total, migrant laborers comprise 7.8-10.2% of the total workforce. The FMS estimates that migrants contribute up to 8% of Russia's GDP.

One cannot have a discussion about the demand for migrant labor in Russia without talking about the quota system, however, because the above-stated numbers have no bearing on how quotas for foreign workers are set each year. One of the most significant problems with the current immigration regime, in fact, is with the mechanism used to determine how many workers from the CIS are allowed to register for work permits each year. Each year employers are asked to submit estimates of how many foreign workers they will need for the following year along with a justification for why the domestic labor force is insufficient for their needs. The Ministry of Health aggregates these requests and sends them to the government for approval. However, quotas are consistently lower than the actual need for foreign labor. For example, in 2008 the quota was exhausted by May. Low quotas are politically necessary, however, as

on the whole the public does not approve of a large influx of foreign labor. Low quotas are also economically beneficial to employers, because they force migrants who do not have access to the proper paperwork into the shadow sector, where they can be hired for lower wages and without social benefits or payment of taxes. Such data confirms the hypothesis that mismatched social attitude and economic need for migrants is concurrent with a situation in which much migration practice occurs in the shadow sector.

Also as evidence of the dominance of informal practices, the study must take into account reports of worker abuses at the hands of their employers, especially those that are not reported to or pursued by authorities. Often these situations involve migrants being kept captive at their place of work because their documents are in the possession of their employer, making it dangerous or at the very least intimidating to go off premises and risk encountering police. Looking at case law alone would not be sufficient to capture violations of worker rights. This is partly due to the state of the courts in Russia, though some cases are brought. More importantly, NGOs that work on behalf of migrants often try to solve problems outside of court. For example the director of one of these organizations described their method of confronting employers that have, for example, been accused of wage arrears. Migrant advocates contact the employer to let them know their actions are illegal and they should pay the migrant their wages if they would like to keep the violation out of the press and away from official channels. Other organizations are more likely to help migrants using the legal system, bringing their cases into a formal court. This other type of migrant assistance works not only to help migrants, but also works to create legal precedent and judicial procedure that is more in line with the protection of migrant rights. As far as this research was able to identify, only one such organization works in Moscow. A lawyer from a third Moscow-based organization described to me how they encourage migrants to use legal channels, such as reporting violations to the police, but do not intervene over and above contacting the police when a migrant chooses to work through official channels. She explained that it is simply too difficult to offer legal assistance in these cases.

It is easy to explain the supply-push factors that cause migrants to seek work outside their country of origin. An economist from a major Moscow university specializing in Central Asia identifies wage differentials between Russia and the home countries of migrants as the single most important factor contributing to labor migration. Of course the fact that citizens of CIS countries do not need visas to come to Russia also contributes to these migration flows. The non-visa regime especially contributes to a higher rate of illegal migrants from CIS countries, as it is easy to come legally and simply overstay the period of legal stay. A more controversial point is that the shared Soviet past contributes to migration from former Soviet states. One Muscovite interviewed especially pointed to the shared culture of corruption, which makes the “rules” of navigating the bureaucracy more predictable. In other words, immigrants from the CIS know very well that if they can’t accomplish certain tasks through official channels, there is likely an easy alternative through shadow agents.

Finally, the employer side of the labor market reveals some interesting results. I went to Russia seeking evidence of both formal and informal tactics of lobbying for their economic interests. Formal tactics involve direct requests to the government, while informal tactics involve relying on personal relationships to influence political processes. I found virtually no evidence for formal tactics, though there is a nascent lobbying movement. However it is unclear whether these lobbying efforts rely on formally regulated procedures or are managed through personal relationships. One scholar interviewed speculated that the reduction of quotas in the sphere of market trading originated from the lobbying efforts of a large trading company that experienced competition from markets. Causal relationships like these are nearly impossible to prove in Russia because no records are kept of agreements or donations or any sort of statistics formally connecting lobbyists to lawmakers.

Informal processes, on the other hand, are very much a part of every-day life in Russia, and no less in the sphere of labor relations. These processes are common knowledge throughout Russian society. Several representatives of international organizations commented to me that it is most profitable for both

employers and employees to operate in the shadow sphere, and that this is a global principle. The primary benefit of operating in the shadows is avoiding the red tape of taxes and bureaucratic hurdles such as paperwork and fees. In Russia there is little disincentive for operating in the shadows because of the lack of regulation and pervasive corruption.

Employers must pay as much as 56% tax for foreign employees. Even native workers are often officially paid low salaries to avoid tax burdens (with an additional sum paid via “black envelope”). Fines for employing illegal workers are quite severe, up to 800,000 rubles (\$25,000) per illegal migrant. Though published FMS statistics for the amount collected in 2008 is quite an impressive sum, a labor expert interviewed explained that it is actually a joke because the sum is not nearly so impressive when divided by the maximum fine. Then it is only around 4,000 fines imposed. Both because the chances of being fined are so low, and because of the possibility to pay bribes in order to avoid formal fines, employers may confidently hire illegal workers.

Another important aspect of employment of migrants is the private employment agencies that act as middlemen between migrants and large companies. According to a labor expert in Moscow, these private employment agencies are not regulated or monitored. Often times they bring workers from Central Asian countries, charging them a fee for transport and processing of fees, and then deliver them to employers in Russia. In the experience of a lawyer of a NGO that works with victims of trafficking, this is often how migrants find themselves in situations of forced labor. These middlemen take migrants’ passports and either keep them or hand them over to the employer. Furthermore, the migrants are most often “employed” by the private employment agency, and therefore the company actually using the migrants’ labor has no real link (and therefore liability) to the workers.

An interesting example of how the social, political and economic spheres work together is found in the (timely, for the purpose of this research) closing of Cherkizovski market in June 2009. The biggest market in Eastern Europe, Cherkizovski was operated with the labor of tens of thousands of migrants from the CIS, Vietnam and China. Those I interviewed were divided on whether the majority of migrants were likely legal or illegal. However dozens of illegal migrants were deported when the market was closed. The media reports about the market’s closing were constant and are still frequent even months later. Some reports say that the market was closed on account of sanitary conditions. Others say it was in connection with shipments of contraband goods from China. Still others cite a feud between Moscow city and Federal governments. According to this last scenario Telman Ismailov, a Moscow oligarch who owned the market, angered federal authorities when he very publically celebrated the opening of an extravagant hotel he built in Turkey, investing vast sums of money outside of Russia in the time of the financial crisis. The opening of the hotel was followed by criticism from Putin that an investigation headed by city officials into the issue of contraband goods at Cherkizovski was not producing needed results. That mayor Luzhkov was very publically present at the opening of Ismailov’s hotel causes many to think that Ismailov received special treatment from Luzhkov and the city. Luzhkov’s wife, Elena Baturina, is one of the richest people in Russia whose consent is necessary for every economic act in Moscow. After Putin’s criticism of city authorities, federal organs closed the market. Some see this turn of events as a signal that federal bodies are attempt to encroach on Luzhkov’s power. In this case, migrants are merely a pawn in the game of major power politics.

Thus it is quite clear that informal processes dominate the sphere of migration regulation. What is not yet clear is whether these informal processes are more or less dominant than in countries that do not experience tension between social and economic factors. To repeat, this project proceeds under the hypotheses that a) democratic countries will have more open immigration regimes, b) countries with relatively more xenophobia will have more closed immigration regimes, and c) countries in which social factors such as xenophobia conflict with economic demand for migrant will regulate migration through informal processes more than in countries where there is less social-economic tension. Now that the

Russia portion of the research is complete I can develop the comparative measures necessary to place the Russian immigration regime in global context.

Policy recommendations:

1. The US should first work to repair and foster diplomatic relations with Russia, realizing the US will only have a hearing on sensitive human rights issues in the context of warm diplomatic relations.
2. Encourage Russia's compliance with international human rights norms and treaties. Not only should the US work bilaterally with Russia toward these goals, but it should lead by example through passage of major human rights treaties.
3. Encourage the continued development and implementation of migration and labor policies that will protect the rights of migrants.
4. Support and work through existing local organizations toward the goal of achieving policy and human rights goals. Organizations in Moscow are working in a variety of creative ways and achieving good results. These organizations work more freely than a Western organization likely would.